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Abstract
This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration on the
native born within a dynamic general equilibrium framework with labor market frictions. A
key feature of the model is that job competition is allowed for between domestic workers and
illegal immigrants. We calibrate the model to match some key statistics of the postwar U.S.
economy. The model predicts that in the long run illegal immigration is a boon, but the em-
ployment opportunities of domestic workers are strongly negatively a¤ected. The model also
predicts that the level of domestic consumption has a U-shaped relationship with the share of
illegal immigrants.
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1 Introduction
Illegal immigration is a contentious issue facing most developed economies. In the United States,
for instance, scholars have heatedly debated the pros and cons of illegal immigration for years. The
main economic argument in support of immigration is that it helps increase the supply of labor,
reduces the cost of production and hence is good for the economy. Primary opposing arguments
include supposed high rates of use of welfare programs, immigrant poverty and job competition.
Much of the discussion is motivated by concerns for the welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration on the
native born. However, most research applying partial-equilibrium analysis has only addressed slices
of this problem through analyzing the e¤ects of immigration on labor-market outcomes. There is
only a small set of theoretical studies that address this issue of illegal immigration in a general
equilibrium context. These studies have noticeable limitations. Among them, Ethier (1986) and
Bond and Chen (1987) are carried out within a static context and they pay particular attention
to problems and prescriptions for border control. Following the Ramsey tradition, subsequent
research supplements the literature by investigating this issue within a one-sector dynamic general
equilibrium framework. These studies include Hazari and Sgro (2003), Moy and Yip (2006), and
Palivos (2009).
One common limitation among all existing studies is that they assume full employment in do-
mestic labor market. These models thus ignore the e¤ect of illegal immigration on the employment
opportunities of domestic workers. In fact, one common argument in general against immigration
is that immigrants harm the employment opportunities of native workers. Studies failing to address
this issue cannot capture the whole picture of the e¤ects of illegal immigration. The primary objec-
tive of this paper is to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that can be used to evaluate
the displacement e¤ects of illegal immigration on native workers. To the best of our knowledge, so
far no such theoretical model has been developed.
To achieve this objective, this study builds upon the contributions of Shi and Wen (1997) and
models illegal immigration in a standard dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market
frictions. One key feature of our model that di¤erentiates it from the previous literature is that we
allow both domestic workers and illegal immigrants to search for jobs at the same time, which in
turn leads to job competition between them and consequently increases the unemployment rate of
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native workers.
In the model economy, each individual has three alternative, mutually exclusive uses of one
indivisible unit of time: searching for a job, working for a rm, or enjoying leisure. Firms hire both
domestic and illegal immigrant workers. The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions.
Once unemployed domestic workers and job vacancies are matched, the terms of employment con-
tracts are determined through bilateral bargaining. We assume that rms are able to distinguish
illegal immigrants from domestic workers and face a punishment for hiring the former if being
caught. The wage rate for illegal immigrants is thus equated to the wage rate of domestic workers
minus the expected value of the punishment. We characterize the search equilibrium and prove the
existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium.
The model generates important theoretical predictions due to the incorporation of illegal immi-
grants. Within this dynamic general equilibrium framework, we are able to show analytically that
the long-run level of the unemployment rate for domestic citizens is increasing in the share of illegal
immigrants in the total population for the case in which natives and illegal immigrant workers are
perfect substitutes in the production process. We also uncover that the entry of illegal immigrants
makes domestic workers face tighter labor markets in the long run.
To develop the quantitative implications of our model, we numerically solve and calibrate the
model to match some key statistics of the postwar U.S. economy. Palivos (2009) nds that illegal
immigration necessarily lowers the long-run level of per capita consumption and welfare of domestic
citizens. In sharp contrast, the quantitative predictions of this study indicate that the long-run
level of consumption of domestic citizens has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal
immigrants. In other words, an increase in the number of illegal immigrants rst reduces and then
raises the long-run level of per capita domestic consumption. This nding is due to the presence
of four e¤ects at work. (1) A positive exploitation e¤ect. When there is an increase in the number
of illegal immigrants, a greater number of unemployed illegal immigrants are searching for jobs.
In contrast, the change in the number of domestic workers searching for jobs is small. This leads
to a tighter labor market which in turn leads to more erce competition for jobs. To successfully
secure a job, both domestic and foreign labor would have to lower their wages. This raises the
rms prots which are then distributed to domestic households as dividends. This e¤ect adds to
domestic consumption. (2) A negative capital-using-up e¤ect. This is due to the fact that in the
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domestic economy some capital has to be used to produce output for the consumption of illegal
migrants. This e¤ect reduces current output which could have been used for domestic consumption
and investment. (3) A negative wage depressing e¤ect. As mentioned above, when more illegal
immigrants enter into the economy, the competition for jobs becomes more severe. Thus, the wages
for domestic labor are pushed down. (4) A negative displacement e¤ect. As unemployed domestic
labor and migrants compete for jobs, the chance for unemployed domestic workers to nd a job
is reduced. This e¤ect reduces domestic consumption. Empirical studies on this topic often focus
on (3) and (4) (for instance, see Hotchkiss and Myriam 2008). These four e¤ects work together
to determine the relationship between the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens and
the share of illegal immigrants. Under the baseline parameterization, the negative e¤ects dominate
when the population fraction of illegal immigrants is small. Thus, an increase in illegal immigration
would lead to a drop in consumption. However, as the share of illegal immigrants continues to
increase, the long-run level of domestic consumption would rise as the positive e¤ect eventually
dominates. This gives rise to the U-shaped relationship between the long-run level of consumption
of domestic citizens and the share of illegal immigrants.
In order to shed some light on the welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration, we compute the
consumption-equivalent level of utility of domestic households and nd that illegal immigration
has a positive welfare e¤ect. In particular, we compare two scenarios: (1) the economy stays at
the steady state with no illegal immigrants forever; and (2) at t = 0, the host country admits a
certain fraction of illegal immigrants and the economy gradually converges to the new steady state.
The welfare measure of illegal immigration is calculated for a wide variety of combinations of labor
supply elasticity and population share of illegal immigrants. For instance, we nd that the domestic
households would require a :746-percent increase in their consumption under scenario (1) in every
period when the labor supply elasticity is 0:4 and when there is an increase in the population share
of illegal immigrants from zero to 5 percent. The model also generates a prediction on employment
opportunities of domestic workers. It predicts that employment opportunities of domestic workers
are strongly negatively a¤ected in the long run. Specically, a greater number of domestic workers
will leave the labor force when there is an increase in illegal immigration. In contrast, the labor
force participation rate for illegal immigrants experiences a slight decrease. This result turns out to
be qualitatively supported by the existing empirical evidence (for instance, see Borjas et al., 2007).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the search-theoretic
model of unemployment and analyzes the search equilibrium. Section 3 studies the welfare e¤ect of
illegal immigration on domestic citizens and discusses the quantitative implications of the model.
Finally, Section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economy that is inhabited by two types of households, i.e., domestic (D) and illegal
immigrant (M) households.1 The number of each type of households is normalized to one. Each
household consists of many innitely lived agents. We use L(t) and M(t) to denote the size of each
domestic and immigrant household at any time t  0, respectively. We call N(t) = L(t)+M(t) the
total population. Both L(t) andM(t) are assumed to be growing at the same constant rate g > 0.2
The share of illegal immigrants in the total population is constant over time m = M(t)N(t) . Each
household member at each point in time is endowed with one indivisible unit of time that has three
alternative, mutually exclusive uses: searching for a job, working for a rm, or enjoying leisure.
Throughout we use a superscript i 2 fD;Mg to indicate these two types of households. The variable
si1(t) is the fraction of the households time in work, and s
i
2(t) is the fraction of the households
time in search. The variable si1(t) is also referred to as the search e¤ort. Accordingly, at the
aggregate level, a representative domestic household spends L1(t) = sD1 (t)L(t) of its total amount
of time in search, and L2(t) = sD2 (t)L(t) in work. Similarly, deneM1(t) = s
M
1 (t)M(t) andM2(t) =
sM2 (t)M(t) as the respective aggregate amount of time in search and in work for a representative
illegal immigrant household. The domestic labor participation rate and unemployment rate can be
termed as sD1 (t) + s
D
2 (t) and
sD1 (t)
sD1 (t)+s
D
2 (t)
; respectively.
Aggregate output Y (t) is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas production technology that
takes as inputs aggregate capital K(t) and aggregate labor L2(t) +M2(t),
Y (t) = [K(t)][L2(t) +M2(t)]
1 ,  2 (0; 1);
1Although both legal and illegal immigrants act as a factor substitute for native labor of similar skill, in this model,
we only consider illegal immigrants because they work as a cheaper production substitute for domestic workers of the
same level of labor productivity.
2 Imposing this assumption is to ensure balanced growth properties of the model.
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where  is the capital share of national income. Domestic labor L2(t) and illegal migrants M2(t)
are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production.3
2.1 Domestic Households Utility Maximization Problem
In each period, each household member derives utility from consumption and disutility from working
and searching for jobs. The momentary utility function of a typical agent is given by
u[c(t); sD1 (t) + s
D
2 (t)] = log c(t)  
[sD1 (t) + s
D
2 (t)]
1+
1+
;  > 0; and  > 0; (1)
where  denotes the inverse of labor supply elasticity, and  is a preference parameter.
The households total discounted utility is described by
U =
Z 1
0
e ( g)tu[c(t); sD1 (t) + s
D
2 (t)]dt: (2)
The variables C(t) and c(t) = C(t)=L(t) are aggregate and individual consumption of the domestic
household, respectively.4 The parameter  > 0 is the discount rate, and   g the e¤ective discount
rate, which is assumed to be greater than zero.
A worker receives a wage rate w(t) when he enters an employment relationship. Let r(t) denote
the rate of return to capital net of depreciation at time t; and (t) be the amount of dividends
that a household receives by owning the rm. Thus, the momentary budget constraint faced by a
representative domestic household is
_K(t) + C(t) = w(t)L2(t) + r(t)K(t) + (t):
Dividing it by the size of population N(t) gives the budget constraint in per capita terms as
_k(t) + k(t)g + c(t) = w(t)sD2 (t)+ r(t)k(t) + (t); (3)
where _%(t)  d%(t)dt is the time derivative of the variable %(t),  = L(t)=N(t) is the ratio of domestic
3The same assumption is also adopted in Hazari and Sgro (2003), Moy and Yip (2006), and Palivos (2009).
4Following Merz (1995), we assume that there are a large number of agents in each household. They pool their
income and care only about the households utility. By doing so they provide each other with complete insurance
against variations in labor income due to unemployment.
5
to total population, (t) = (t)=N(t) is dividend per capita and k(t) = K(t)=N(t) is capital per
capita.5
The number of employed domestic workers evolves according to
_L2(t) = (t)L1(t)  L2(t); (4)
where (t) is the rate at which unemployed workers nd jobs and  > 0 is the job destruction
rate. In equilibrium, (t) is determined by the aggregate numbers of job vacancies and unemployed
workers. In the utility maximization problem, however, (t) is taken as given by a representative
household. Upon dividing by N(t), an individuals employment evolves according to the law of
motion:
_sD2 (t) = (t)s
D
1 (t)  sD2 (t)  gsD2 (t): (5)
The representative domestic households optimization problem is to choose a set of time paths
c(t), sD1 (t), k(t), s
D
2 (t)
	
so as to maximize (2) subject to (3), (5) and two initial conditions:
k(0) > 0; 1 > sD2 (0) > 0: Let (t) and  (t) be the costate variables. They denote the shadow
prices of households employment and capital, respectively. The rst-order conditions of the rep-
resentative households optimization problem with respect to

c(t), sD1 (t), k(t), s
D
2 (t)
	
and the
associated transversality conditions (TVC) are given by
u
0
c(t) =  (t); (6)
u
0
sD1
(t) =  (t)(t); (7)
_(t) = (+ )(t)  [ (t)w(t)+ u0
sD1
(t)]; (8)
_ (t)
 (t)
=   r(t); (9)
lim
t!1 e
 ( g)t(t)sD2 (t) = 0; (10)
lim
t!1 e
 ( g)t (t)k(t) = 0: (11)
Equation (7) states the rule for the household to decide how much e¤ort it should put into search.
It requires the marginal cost of search to be equal to the marginal benet of search.
5As dened earlier, m = M(t)
N(t)
: Thus, m = 1   holds true for each time period.
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Given the separable utility function form in (1), combining (6) and (9) and rearranging terms
yield a simple expression for the Euler equation:
_c(t)
c(t)
= r(t)  ; (12)
where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is 1. This condition describes the
evolution of individuals consumption. In other words, it states that if r exceeds ; then individual
consumption will expand over time. By using (6), (7), and (8), we obtain
_(t) = (+ )(t) + [w(t)
u
0
c(t)
u
0
sD1
(t)
+ 1](t)(t): (13)
An important implication of (13) is that in order to compensate for the search cost the wage rate
has to be set above the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.6
2.2 Immigrant Households Utility Maximization Problem
Similar to the domestic households, in each period each immigrant household member derives
utility from consumption and disutility from working and searching for jobs. The momentary
utility function of a typical immigrant agent is given by
u[cM (t); sM1 (t) + s
M
2 (t)] = log c
M (t)   [s
M
1 (t) + s
M
2 (t)]
1+
1+
;  > 0; and  > 0: (14)
The migrant households total discounted utility is characterized by
U =
Z 1
0
e ( g)tu[cM (t); sM1 (t) + s
M
2 (t)]dt: (15)
The variables CM (t) and cM (t) = CM (t)=M(t) are aggregate and individual consumption of immi-
grant household, respectively. Under the conventional assumptions in the literature, illegal migrants
are paid at the wage rate wM (t) which is distinct from that paid to domestic labor, w(t).7 This
is due to the fact that in most developed countries, rms have to pay a ne once they are caught
6 It can be shown that if w =  
u
0
sD1
(t)
u
0
c(t)
as in a typical neoclassical model; the shadow price of employment (t) can
grow without bound.
7See also Hazari and Sgro (2003), Moy and Yip (2006), and Palivos (2009).
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hiring illegal migrants. In a competitive market, the wage rate wM (t) is equated to the marginal
product of the illegal immigrants minus the expected value of the punishment. In this study, as
described later, the wage rate for domestic workers is endogenously determined through a Nash
bargaining process. Given the assumption that rms are able to distinguish illegal immigrants
from domestic workers, the wage rate for illegal immigrants is therefore equated to the wage rate of
domestic workers minus the expected value of the punishment. Moreover, its assumed that illegal
migrants do not accumulate capital in the host country. This can be justied by the fact that in
most developed countries illegal immigrants nd no way to legally establish credit and own assets.8
The budget constraint that a representative migrant household faces is therefore
CM (t) = wM (t)M2(t): (16)
Dividing it by N(t) gives the budget constraint in per capita terms as
cM (t) = wM (t)s
M
2 (t): (17)
Analogous to (4), the number of employed illegal immigrants evolves according to
_M2(t) = (t)M1(t)  M2(t): (18)
Upon dividing by N(t), an individuals employment evolves as follows:
_sM2 (t) = (t)s
M
1 (t)  ( + g)sM2 (t): (19)
Let ~(t) be the costate variable of illegal immigrant households employment. The maximization
conditions for the representative immigrant household with respect to

sM1 (t), s
M
2 (t)
	
and the
8This assumption is also made in Hazari and Sgro (2003), Moy and Yip (2006), and Palivos (2009). In Hazari
and Sgro (2003) and Moy and Yip (2006), its assumed that immigrants do not save and hence their consumption
is equal to their income. Palivos (2009) assumes that immigrants do save but they channel all their savings abroad.
The capital accumulation process in the host country is not a¤ected by the illegal immigrantsconsumption-saving
decisions in either way. Therefore, it doesnt matter how illegal immigrant households split their income.
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associated TVC are
usM1
(t) =  ~(t)(t); (20)

~(t) = (+ )~(t)  [ucM (t)wM (t) + UsM2 (t)]; (21)
lim
t!1 e
 ( g)t~(t)sM2 (t) = 0: (22)
In particular, (20) governs illegal immigrant households optimal decision on the search e¤ort.
2.3 Production
In this economy, there are a large number of identical rms. Firms hire both domestic and foreign
labor from the labor market to produce output. In order to hire labor, the rm has to post job
vacancies V (t). Each vacancy costs d > 0 units of output. The probability that a rm nds an
unemployed worker is (t): Similar to (t), (t) is determined by the aggregate numbers of job
vacancies and unemployed workers in equilibrium. However, in the prot maximization problem,
(t) is taken as given by a representative rm. The law of motion of a rms employment is given
by:
_L2(t) + _M2(t) = (t)V (t)  [L2(t) +M2(t)]: (23)
Taking the factor prices as given, a representative rm chooses a set of time paths fK(t), L2(t), M2(t), V (t)g
so as to maximize its present value of the future prot streams. Formally, this is given by
Max   =
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 r()d(t)dt;
subject to (23), and
(t) = F [K(t); L2(t) +M2(t)]  [r(t) + ]K(t) w(t)L2(t) wM (t)M2(t)  pM2(t)  dV (t): (24)
The parameter  is the rate of capital depreciation, and p 2 (0; 1) the probability that a rm which
employs illegal migrants gets detected.9 The ne for employing illegal migrants is normalized to
one per illegal immigrant worker. Let (t) and 
(t) be the costate variables of rms employment
9This probability can surely be a¤ected by a countrys enforcement budget. In the present model, its assumed to
be constant.
9
of domestic and foreign labor, respectively. Interior solutions of the above maximization problem
are characterized by the rst-order conditions
F
0
k(t) = r(t) + ; (25)
(t) =
d
(t)
; (26)

(t) = (t); (27)
_(t) = [r(t) + ](t) + w(t)  FL2(t); (28)
_
(t) = [r(t) + ]
(t) + wM (t) + p  FM2(t): (29)
Equation (25) is the usual condition which states that the rental rate on capital is equated to
the marginal product of capital. Equation (26) governs the rms optimal vacancy decisions. The
marginal cost of vacancy d equals the marginal benet of vacancy (t)(t). Equation (28) demon-
strates that if there is no vacancy maintaining cost for the rm i.e., d = 0, we would obtain the
standard neoclassical productivity condition for labor w(t) = FL2(t). In that case, rms would post
an innite number of vacancies and there will not any search frictions in the labor market. With
positive d; however, the wage rate for domestic workers w(t) is less than the marginal product of
labor FL2(t) in this model.
The relationship between the wage rates paid to domestic worker w(t) and illegal immigrant
wM (t) is given by
wM (t) = w(t)  p: (30)
The wage rate w(t) for domestic workers is determined through a Nash bargaining process which
will become clear later on. As p is positive, it follows that wage rate wM (t) paid to illegal migrants
is strictly lower than that paid to domestic labor. Notice that the above condition also indicates
that the punishment of hiring illegal immigrants is completely borne by the illegal immigrants
themselves. Firms therefore do not su¤er directly from employing illegal immigrant workers.
2.4 Matching and Wage Determination
The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers
are brought together in a pair-wise fashion by a stochastic search-matching process. The search
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part follows from the fact that both domestic workers and immigrants invest some time and e¤ort
in searching for jobs. Meanwhile, rms seek workers to ll vacant job positions. The matching
part of the process is derived from a matching function which pairs the unemployed workers with
vacancies. For analytical convenience, we employ a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant
returns-to-scale.10 The number of successful job matches  is determined by the following matching
function:
[V (t); L1(t) +M1(t)] = 0[V (t)]
[L1(t) +M1(t)]
1 ;  2 (0; 1)
where V (t) is the number of vacancies, L1(t)+M1(t) is the number of unemployed workers searching
for jobs,  is the elasticity of vacancy in job matches, and 0 > 0 is assumed to be constant over
time.
Given the Cobb-Douglas matching function, the vacancy-matching rate (t) and the job-nding
rate (t) are obtained as follows:
(t) =
(t)
V (t)
= 0[x(t)]
 1; (31)
(t) =
(t)
L1(t) +M1(t)
= 0[x(t)]
; (32)
) (t) = (t)
x(t)
;
where the ratio between the vacancies and the unemployed workers, x(t) = V (t)L1(t)+M1(t) ; is con-
ventionally labeled as the tightness of the labor market. Intuitively, it captures the pressure that
unemployed workers and rms face in the labor market. Specically, workers and employers face
a tighter labor market when x(t) is smaller. The above expressions make clear the dependence of
the rates (t) and (t) on the tightness of the labor market x(t): In particular, (t) falls with x(t)
and (t) rises with x(t):
With the use of this matching function, the equilibrium outcomes are not Pareto optimal. This
is due to the presence of search externalities inherent in the model. The intuition is as follows. On
the one hand, with more unemployed workers participating in search, rms will be benecial since
vacancies are more likely to be lled. However, unemployed workers will su¤er as their chance to
10The Cobb-Douglas matching function is also empirically veried. See, for instance, Blanchard and Diamond
(1989).
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match themselves with a job is reduced. On the other hand, with more open vacancies, unemployed
workers win while rms searching for workers lose. Thus, the decentralized outcome is not e¢ cient
because workers and rms do not take into consideration the costs that they impose on others. The
activities that generate a negative externality are carried out to a greater extent than are socially
desirable.
Unemployed domestic workers and vacant jobs meet in pairs. A successful job match generates
a surplus for both unemployed domestic workers and employers. How is this surplus shared between
them? It is a matter of bargaining. The standard search and matching model assumes that by
choosing a proper wage rate this surplus is maximized according to the Nash solution to a bargaining
problem. In particular, if a rm hires a domestic worker, then the surplus to the rm from employing
him is f
0
sD2
(t)   w(t):11 On the other hand, if a domestic worker chooses to work for a rm, then
the gain to him from accepting the job is w(t)   [ 
u
0
sD2
(t)
u0c(t)
]:12 Hence, there exists a possibility of
a mutually advantageous deal. Let  2 (0; 1) and 1    represent the relative bargaining powers
of domestic labor and rms, respectively. A domestic worker and a rm jointly determine the
employment contract under the assumption that each rm-worker pair takes the behavior of other
such pairings as given. The optimal wage contract under Nash bargaining is derived by solving
Max
w(t)
f(1  ) log[f 0
sD2
(t)  w(t)] +  log[w(t)  ( 
u
0
sD2
(t)
u0c(t)
)]g:
The solution of this is given by
w(t) = f
0
sD2
(t) + (1  )[ 
u
0
sD2
(t)
u0c(t)
]: (33)
The optimal wage is a weighted average of the workers marginal product of labor and reservation
wage, which is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. If domestic
workers have relative stronger bargaining strength, i.e.,  is closer to one, then the optimal wage
is closer to the marginal product of labor. In this model, illegal immigrants have no bargaining
11As denoted above, k(t) = K(t)=N(t); the Cobb-Douglas production function in per capita terms can be written
as f [k; sD2 + (1  )sM2 ] = k[sD2 + (1  )sM2 ]1 :
12The derivative of u with respect to sD2 (t) is negative i.e., u
0
sD2 (t)
< 0: The expression [ 
u
0
sD2 (t)
u
0
c(t)
] represents the
domestic workersendogenized reservation wage.
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power, i.e., they are not allowed to bargain over the wage with the rms. Rather, as mentioned
above, their wage rate wM (t) is determined by (30).
2.5 Market Equilibrium
In this subsection, we provide all the necessary ingredients of this model as follows:
Denition A search equilibrium consists of a set of time paths
fc(t); cM (t); k(t); v(t); sD1 (t); sD2 (t); sM1 (t); sM2 (t) j t  0g; prices fr(t); w(t); wM (t) j t  0g; prot
f(t) j t  0g; and matching rates f(t); (t) j t  0g such that
1. Given fr(t); w(t); (t); (t) j t  0g, fc(t); k(t); sD1 (t); sD2 (t) j t  0g solves the domestic
households problem.
2. Given fwM (t); (t) j t  0g, fcM (t); sM1 (t); sM2 (t) j t  0g solves the immigrant households
problem.
3. Given fr(t); w(t); wM (t); (t) j t  0g, fk(t); v(t); sD2 (t); sM2 (t) j t  0g solves the rms
problem.
4. The wage rate w(t) is determined by (33).
5. The matching rates are given by (31) and (32):
6. All markets clear.
(a) The goods market clears at every t  0, i.e.,
C(t) + _K(t) + K(t) = F [K(t); L2(t) +M2(t)]  CM (t)  pM2(t)  dV (t) for all t  0:
(b) In the labor market, in equilibrium, the ows of workers into employment must equal the
ows of vacancies matched with unemployed agents, i.e., (t)[L1(t)+M1(t)] = (t)V (t):
(4), (18), and (23) indicate that the total supply for labor equals the demand for labor
at every t  0.
13
2.6 Characterization of Equilibrium
After simple manipulations and substitutions, the equilibrium dened above is summarized by the
following seven di¤erential equations which together determine the dynamic properties of 	 
[c(t); k(t); x(t); sD1 (t); s
D
2 (t); s
M
1 (t); s
M
2 (t)]
T :
_c(t)
c(t)
= f
0
k(t)     ; (34)
_k(t) = f(t)  k(t)g   k(t)   c(t)  [f 0
sD2
(t) + (1  )
u
0
sD2
(t)
u0c(t)
]sM2 (t)(1  )  dv(t); (35)
_x(t) =
x(t)
1   (+ ) 
(t)(1  )
d(1  ) [fsD2 (t) 
u
0
sD2
(t)
u0c(t)
]; (36)
_sD1 (t) = (+ )
u
0
sD1
(t)
u
00
sD1
(t)sD1 (t)
+
u
0
c(t)w(t)(t)
u
00
sD1
(t)sD1 (t)
+
u
0
sD2
(t)(t)
u
00
sD1
(t)sD1 (t)
; (37)
_sD2 (t) = (t)s
D
1 (t)  ( + g)sD2 (t); (38)
_sM1 (t) = (+ )
u
0
sM1
(t)
u
00
sM1
(t)sM1 (t)
+
u
0
cM
(t)wM (t)(t)
u
00
sM1
(t)sM1 (t)
+
u
0
sM2
(t)(t)
u
00
sM1
(t)sM1 (t)
; (39)
_sM2 (t) = (t)s
M
1 (t)  ( + g)sM2 (t): (40)
The three initial conditions of this system are k(0); sD2 (0); and s
M
2 (0):
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Proposition 1: A unique steady state 	 exists.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix. Notice that this unique steady state is in per capita
terms. All aggregate variables, such as K(t); C(t); are still growing at rate g > 0:
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we develop the quantitative implications of our model. Thus, we rst numerically
solve and calibrate the model to match some key statistics of the postwar U.S. economy. Then we
discuss those quantitative predictions in order. Specically, we answer the following three questions:
1. Will the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens decrease in the population share
of illegal immigrants?
13The mathematical derivations of these di¤erential equations are available from the author upon request.
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2. How domestic workersemployment opportunities are a¤ected by illegal immigration ows in
the long run?
3. What is the welfare e¤ect of illegal immigration on the host country?
3.1 Parameterization
This subsection presents the procedure used to parameterize the model. The specic numerical
values to the parameters of the model are assigned so that the model can match as closely as
possible some key statistics for the U.S. economy for the postwar period. In particular, the model
aims to match U.S. facts on the labor participation rate, the unemployment rate, the average
capital-output ratio, and the real interest rate.
There are eleven parameters which need to be assigned in this model: the preference parameters
, , and ; the production parameters  and ; the search-matching parameters 0; ; , the rate
of population growth g; the bargaining power of domestic labor  and the unit cost of vacancy d:
As a time period is normalized to be one quarter, each parameter is interpreted quarterly.
The preference parameter  is set equal to 3:7939 to match the steady-state labor force partici-
pation rate of 0:68. This is consistent with the U.S. labor force participation rate for the population
aged 16 years old and over in the postwar period.14 We choose the depreciation rate on capital
 = 0:0108 so that the quarterly capital-output ratio in the steady state is equal to 12; which roughly
matches the average capital-output ratio in postwar U.S. data (Cooley et al., 1995). The unit cost
of vacancy d is set at 2:064 to achieve the steady-state unemployment rate of 0:06, which matches
the U.S. quarterly average unemployment rate in the postwar period.15 We use the discount rate
 = 0:01 so that the steady-state annual interest rate is roughly 4% (Siegel 2002).16
The value of the capitals share of national income  is set to 0:25, which falls in the range
in Gollin (2002).17 We set the value of  = 2:5 to obtain a labor supply elasticity of { = 0:4
(Killingsworth 1983). We also allow { to take di¤erent values 0:2, 0:7 and 1. The parameter 0 is
commonly normalized to one. As indicated in Blanchard and Diamond (1989), the parameter for
14Source: U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics
<http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS11300000>
15U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has documented the annual average unemployment rate from 1948 to the present.
16Siegel (2002) suggests the average of the real return to stock and long-term bonds over the period 1946-2001 is
0.042.
17Gollin (2002) indicates that the labor shares for most countries fall in the range of 0.65-0.80.
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the elasticity of vacancy in job matches is 0:6, hence  = 0:6:We use the exogenous job destruction
rate  = 0:05; which resembles the quarterly employment-unemployment transition probability (Shi
and Wen 1999). The value of bargaining power of labor  is set to 0:5, a value commonly used in
the literature. We use the rate of population growth g = 0:0027 as the annual population growth
rate in the postwar US is roughly 1%: The baseline parameterization is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
Preferences  = 0:01;  = 2:5;  = 3:7939:
Production  = 0:25;  = 0:0108:
Matching 0 = 1;  = 0:6;  = 0:05:
Others g = 0:0027;  = 0:5; d = 2:064:
3.2 Local Dynamics
We next examine local dynamics by linearizing the system of di¤erential equations in the neighbor-
hood of the steady state. As stated in Proposition 1, the nonlinear dynamic system has a unique
steady state at 	  (c; k; x; sD1 ; sD2 ; sM1 ; sM2 )T . Let J be the 77 Jacobian matrix evaluated
at the steady state 	.
The dynamic properties of the linearized system is determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix J: The predetermined variables are k(t); sD2 (t); and s
M
2 (t): Saddle-path stability requires that
the number of stable eigenvalues be exactly the same as the number of predetermined variables.
Therefore, the matrix J needs to have three stable eigenvalues and four unstable eigenvalues in
order to ensure the existence of a unique transition path.
In the quantitative exercise, we allow the population share of illegal immigrants m to vary
between 0 and 0:5.18 In all of these experiments we obtain three stable eigenvalues and four
unstable eigenvalues. By allowing { to take values in f0:2; 0:4; 0:7; 1g, we nd that the above result
is robust with respect to changes in the labor supply elasticity. The values of the stable eigenvalues
are reported in Table 2. Thus, the unique steady state is saddle-path stable under the baseline
parameterization.
18 In this study, we only consider the case in which the number of illegal immigrants is less than that of domestic
citizens. Therefore, we allow m to vary from 0 through 0:5.
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3.3 Macroeconomic E¤ects
In this subsection, we develop the quantitative implications of the model. In particular, we focus
on the steady-state e¤ects of illegal immigration. In order to demonstrate the economic impact of
illegal immigration on domestic residents, we now perform some comparative static experiments.
In the rst comparative static experiment we are concerned with the e¤ects on the long-run level of
domestic consumption when there is an increase in the share of illegal immigrants in the population.
Specically, by allowing the fraction of immigration m to take values from 0 through 0:5; we
compute a series of steady states to capture the response of domestic consumption to an inux of
illegal immigrants.
The quantitative prediction of the present model is that the long-run level of consumption of
domestic citizens has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal immigrants (see Figure 2).
In other words, an increase in the number of illegal immigrants rst reduces and then raises the
long-run consumption of the domestic citizens.19
The intuitions of these results are as follows. The presence of illegal migration has four e¤ects.
The rst one is the exploitation e¤ect. As shown in Figure 2, when there is an increase in the
number of illegal immigrants, a greater number of unemployed illegal immigrants are searching
for jobs. In contrast, the change in the number of domestic workers searching for jobs is small.
This leads to a tighter labor market which in turn leads to more erce competition for jobs. To
successfully secure a job, both domestic and foreign labor would have to lower their wages. The
rms therefore make more prots. In turn, domestic citizens receive more dividends which can
be used for consumption and investment. This e¤ect adds to domestic consumption. Second,
the capital-using-up e¤ect. This is due to the fact that the illegal immigrants do not save in the
domestic economy. Some capital has to be used to produce output for the consumption of illegal
migrants. This e¤ect reduces current output which could have been used for domestic consumption
and investment. Third, the displacement e¤ect. As unemployed domestic labor and migrants
compete for jobs, the chance for unemployed domestic workers to nd a job is reduced. This e¤ect
lowers their consumption. Fourth, the wage depressing e¤ect of illegal immigrants.20 As more
19As the number of illegal immigrants increases, the variable  decreases and vice versa.
20This wage depressing e¤ect of illegal immigrant workers has been documented in Hotchkiss and Myriam (2008).
Borjas (2003) also concludes that a 10-percent increase in labor supply could reduce wages by 3-4 percent.
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illegal immigrants enter into the economy, the competition for jobs becomes more severe. Thus,
the wages of domestic labor are pushed down. The net impact of illegal immigration on domestic
consumption hinges upon the magnitude of these four e¤ects. If the exploitation e¤ect dominates,
domestic consumption will rise. Otherwise, it will fall.
More precisely, the steady-state equilibrium value of the domestic consumption c is determined
by
c = wsD2 + (  g)
k

+


: (41)
To understand the intuition of this comparative static nding, we di¤erentiate (41) with respect to
 and obtain
dc
d
= [w
dsD2
d
positive| {z }
the displacement e¤ect
+ sD2
dw
d
positive| {z }
]
the wage depressing e¤ect
+ [
1

d
d| {z }
negative
+ (  1



)| {z }
negative
]
| {z }
the exploitation e¤ect
+ [
1

(  g)dk

d| {z }
positive
+ (  1

(  g)k


)| {z }
negative
]
| {z }
the capital-using-up e¤ect
(42)
Equation (42) implies that there are three results generated by an increase in the population share
of illegal immigrants (a decrease in ) in the U.S. The rst result is that domestic labor income
falls. This is due to the displacement and negative wage depressing e¤ects, which are captured by
the two terms in the rst square bracket of (42), respectively. The second square bracket reects
the positive exploitation e¤ect. The reason is that as more illegal migrants are in the U.S., domestic
households receive more dividends which can be used for consumption and investment. The last
square bracket shows how the domestic capital income is a¤ected by the inows of illegal migrants.
When the share of illegal immigrants goes up, the capital per worker k declines while the capital
per domestic citizen k

 rises, which generates additional income for domestic households.
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Figure 2 summarizes the responses of the key variables in this model (c; x; k; w; sD1 +
sD2 ; sM1 + sM2 ;
sD1
sD1 +s
D
2
;
sM1
sM1 +s
M
2
) to a gradual increase in illegal immigration.22 When it goes
up, the model predicts that workers and employers face a tighter labor market, i.e., x goes down,
21 In the steady state, r = : Therefore, the capital income is solely determined by the quantity of capital.
22For di¤erent values of { (e.g. { = 0:2; 0:7; and 1); see corresponding Figure 1; 3;and 4 in the appendix.
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the capital per worker k reduces, the unemployment rate for domestic labor s
D
1
sD1 +s
D
2
rises, the
wage rate w for domestic labor drops, the fraction of domestic residents in search sD1 rises rst
and then declines, and the labor force participation rate of domestic residents sD1 + sD2 falls.
Notice that comparing with domestic residents, we observe that there is only a small reduction
in the labor force participation rate for illegal immigrants sM1 + sM2 . The reason for this is that
with more illegal immigrants in search, domestic workers nd the opportunity cost of searching for
jobs becomes higher so that its optimal to withdraw from supplying labor and to enjoy leisure
instead.23 This result turns out to be consistent with the existing empirical evidence. Borjas et
al. (2007) report that a 10-percent immigrant-induced increase in the supply of a particular skill
group is associated with a reduction in the black employment rate of 3:5 percentage points, and a
1:6 percentage point reduction in the employment rate of white men.
Our results are in sharp contrast with those obtained in previous studies. Analyzing the issue
of illegal immigration under the full employment assumption, Hazari and Sgro (2003) conclude
that illegal immigration necessarily lowers the long-run per capita domestic consumption. Palivos
(2009) obtains an unambiguous positive e¤ect of illegal immigration. It raises the consumption
and welfare of domestic workers. Palivos (2009) also considers a case in which a binding minimum
wage only applies to unskilled workers. His nding is that illegal immigration decreases domestic
consumption.
3.4 Welfare E¤ects
In order to answer the question of how illegal immigration a¤ects domestic welfare, we compute
and compare, using a consumption-equivalent measure as in Lucas (1987), the level of utility of
domestic households under two scenarios.
Let

c(t;m); sD1 (t;m); s
D
2 (t;m)
	
denote the equilibrium time paths when the population share
of illegal immigrants is m: The lifetime utility of the representative domestic household is given by
U(m) =
Z 1
0
flog c(t;m)   [s
D
1 (t;m) + s
D
2 (t;m)]
1+
1+
ge ( g)tdt:
23The gap between domestic workers wage and reservation wage is narrowed with more immigrants owing into
the country.
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The consumption-equivalent measure (m) is dened by
Z 1
0
flog[1 + (m)]c0(t; 0)   [s
D0
1 (t; 0) + s
D0
2 (t; 0)]
1+
1+
ge ( g)tdt = U(m)
1
  g log[1 + (m)] + U(0) = U(m)
If (m) > 0; then U(0) < U(m) which means that the domestic households are better o¤ in the
presence of illegal immigrants. In particular, the domestic households would require a (m)-percent
increase in c
0
(t; 0) in every period so as to make themselves indi¤erent between m = 0 and m > 0:
Hence, illegal immigrants create a welfare gain to the host countrys economy. On the contrary, if
(m) < 0; then U(0) > U(m): The domestic household are now willing to surrender (m)-percent
of c
0
(t; 0) in every period so as to expel the illegal immigrants. This means that illegal immigrants
lead to a welfare loss to the host country.
Suppose the economy starts at the steady state with m = 0: The two scenarios that we consider
are as follows:
1. The economy stays at the steady state with m = 0 forever.
2. At t = 0, the host country admits m > 0 fraction of illegal immigrants and the economy
gradually converges to the new steady state. Hence, U(m) is computed based upon the
transition path. To account for the transition path, the procedure described in Cooley and
Ohanian (1997) is carried out.
Given a specic numerical value of m, we can simply calculate the corresponding (m):24 Table
3 shows the welfare measure of illegal immigration. Three results can be drawn from Table 3:
First, it is instructive to note that illegal immigration induces important net gains among domestic
citizens for any values of (m;{). For instance, when { = 0:4 and when there is an increase in m
from zero to 5 percent in the US, the domestic households would require a :746-percent increase
in c
0
(t; 0) in every period. Second, these gains increase in the share of illegal immigrants in the
population for each xed { that we consider. Third, (m) clearly depends upon the magnitude
24We further restrict our attention to the case in which m can alter only from 0 through 20%. This is due to the
fact that in the traditional host countries, nearly 24:6% of the population in Australia, 22:5% in New Zealand, 18:9%
in Canada, and 12:3% in the United States is foreign-born (United Nations 2004). Among the foreign-born, only a
fraction of them are illegal immigrants.
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of the labor supply elasticity. In particular, for each xed m > 0, (m) decreases with the labor
supply elasticity {:
Table 3: Welfare measure of illegal immigrationa
{ = 0:2 { = 0:4 { = 0:7 { = 1
m (m) (m) (m) (m)
5% 0:756% 0:746% 0:73% 0:727%
10% 2:02% 1:978% 1:833% 1:78%
20% 6:684% 6:34% 5:98% 5:75%b
a Values of other parameters remain the same as in Table 1.
In order to shed some light on the above computational results, we di¤erentiate the domestic
households utility with respect to m and obtain the following expression (43). As we require the
economy to move from zero to an arbitrary amount of illegal immigration, we evaluate (43) at
m = 0. Equation (43) reveals that the e¤ect of illegal immigration on domestic welfare depends on
two factors: (1) the change in the level of per capita consumption of domestic citizens, and (2) the
change in the domestic labor participation rate.
du[c(t); sD1 (t) + s
D
2 (t)]
dm
= uc(t)
dc(t)
dm
jm=0 + usD1 +sD2 (t)
d[sD1 (t) + s
D
2 (t)]
dm
jm=0: (43)
These two factors jointly determine the welfare e¤ect of illegal immigration. In general, its not
possible to obtain denite results analytically. We thus resort to numerical exercises. We focus
on one particular example and examine the transition paths of consumption and leisure. The
example that we consider here is when { = 0:4 and when there is an increase in m from zero to
5 percent. Under the baseline parameterization, illegal immigration lowers domestic consumption
level throughout the entire transition. It rst reduces and then raises the labor force participation
rate during the transition (see Figure 5). By (43), we know that the overall welfare e¤ect is
ambiguous as these two changes tend to move domestic welfare in opposite directions. Nevertheless,
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according to our simulation, the positive welfare e¤ect dominates. Thus, illegal immigration induces
a welfare gain to the host countrys economy. This welfare gain comes from an increase in leisure.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the existing literature on welfare e¤ect of illegal immigration on domestic
workers by introducing illegal immigration into a standard dynamic general equilibrium framework
with labor market frictions. We therefore construct and calibrate a search-theoretic model. In the
model economy, illegal immigrants enter domestic production as perfect substitutes for domestic
workers. They are allowed to spend their one indivisible unit of time in searching for a job, working
for a rm, or enjoying leisure in each period. Firms hire both domestic and illegal immigrant
workers. Once unemployed domestic workers and vacant jobs are paired with each other, they
jointly determine the wage rate through bilateral Nash bargaining. As we assume that rms are
able to distinguish illegal immigrants from domestic workers and face a punishment for hiring the
former if being caught. The wage rate for illegal immigrants is thus equated to the wage rate of
domestic workers minus the expected value of the punishment.
We characterize the search equilibrium and prove the existence and uniqueness of stationary
equilibrium. In contrast to the previous studies, our analysis reveals three striking results. First,
although illegal immigration is indeed a boon to the United States, it signicantly harms the
employment opportunities of domestic workers. Namely, it increases the unemployment rate for
domestic workers. Furthermore, it forces them to face a tighter labor market and even to leave the
labor force. Second, we quantitatively prove that the long-run level of consumption of domestic
citizens has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal immigrants. Third, illegal immigra-
tions negative impact on native wages has been found in this framework. This result turns out to
be qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence.
To close the paper, we like to point out one line of future research. In this study, we assume
that domestic workers and illegal immigrants are perfect substitutes. However, empirical evidence
documents that even with the same level of education, they are not perfect substitutes.25 Therefore,
the analysis will become more interesting if illegal immigrants can be modeled as a separate factor
25For a related dicussion, see, among others, Borjas (2003) and Card and Lemieux (2001).
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of production. Moreover, in real life, the debate over illegal immigration has also concerned with its
distributional e¤ects. Assuming that domestic and foreign labor di¤er in terms of their production
skills, the distributional impact of illegal immigration on domestic workers can be analyzed in a
search-theoretic framework. Nevertheless, this extension would not be trivial. We have to consider
a two-sector version of the search model. This could signicantly increase the dimension of the
dynamic system.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
In a steady-state equilibrium, consumption, c; capital, k; market tightness, x; fraction of
domestic worker in search, sD1 ; fraction of domestic workers in work, sD2 ; fraction of illegal immi-
grants in search, sM1 ; and fraction of illegal immigrant in work, sM2 , are constant over time.
Given the functional forms on utility and production functions, the steady state
(	  (c; k; x; sD1 ; sD2 ; sM1 ; sM2 )T ) can be described by the following seven equations with
seven unknowns:
k
sD2 + (1  )sM2
= (

+ 
)
1
1  ; (44)
c = (

+ 
)

1  [sD2 + (1  )sM2 ]  (1  )(

+ 
)

1  sM2 (1  ) (45)
 (1  )c(sD1 + sD2 )sM2 (1  )  dx[sD1 + (1  )sM1 ]  kg   k;
x(+ ) =
(x)(1  )
d
[(1  )( 
+ 
)

1    c(sD1 + sD2 )]; (46)
+  + (x) =
(1  )( + )

1 (x)
c(sD1 + sD2 )
+ (1  )(x); (47)
(x)sD1 = ( + g)s
D
2 ; (48)
+  + (x) =
(x)
sM2 (sM1 + sM2 )
; (49)
(x)sM1 = ( + g)s
M
2 : (50)
Determination of a unique steady state
The equations (44)-(50) together determine a unique steady state with the following steps.
Step 1, First nd the expression for the marginal rate of substitution (
u
0
sD2
u
0
c
) by using (46).
Substituting it into (47), we can solve for a unique x:
Step 2, Combining (49) together with (50) pins down a unique sM1 :
Step 3, sM2 is obtained by substituting sM1 into (50).
Step 4, Substituting (44), (48), and the expression for marginal rate of substitution (
u
0
sD2
u
0
c
) into
(45) yields a unique sD2 .
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Step 5, The solution for sD1 can be attained by substituting sD2 into (47).
Step 6, k is obtained by substituting sD2 and sM2 into (44).
Step 7, Finally, substituting sD1 ; sD2 and x into the expression for the marginal rate of sub-
stitution (
u
0
sD2
u
0
c
) yields c:
Finding a unique solution for x
_x = 0 implies
x(+ ) =
(x)(1  )
d
[(1  )( 
+ 
)

1    c(sD1 + sD2 )]: (51)
Equation (51) can reexpressed as
c(sD1 + s
D
2 )
 = (1  )( 
+ 
)

1    dx
(+ )
(x)(1  ) : (52)
_sD1 = 0 implies
+  + (x) =
(1  )( + )

1 (x)
c(sD1 + sD2 )
+ (1  )(x): (53)
Substituting (52) into (53) yields
+  + (x) =
(1  )( + )

1 (x)
(1  )( + )

1    dx(+)(x)(1 )
+ (1  )(x)
)  x0 +
(1  )(1  )( + )

1 
d
0 = (+ )x
1 : (54)
Let g(x) = ( + )x1  and h(x) =  x0 +
(1 )(1 )( 
+
)

1  
d 0: Draw both g(x
) and
h(x) in the following diagram.
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The curve for g(x) is strictly increasing, but the curve for h(x) is strictly decreasing with
respect to x. In addition, h(0) > g(0): If a solution to (54) exists then it is unique. In the above
graph, its easy to observe that there exists a unique intersection point between the above two
curves. Thus, (54) yields a unique solution for x.
In order to establish the e¤ect of an increase in illegal immigration on the labor market tightness,
@x
@ ; one can di¤erentiate (54) with respect of .
 x0 +
(1  )(1  )( + )

1 
d
0 = (+ )x
1 
 0
@x
@
+
(1  )(1  )( + )

1 
d
0 = (+ )(1  )x 
@x
@
@x
@
=
0(1  )(1  )( + )

1 
d[(+ )(1  )x  + 0]
> 0: (55)
M " )  #) x #
From (55), we show that there is a positive relationship between x and : Therefore, more
illegal immigrants induce a tighter labor market.
Finding the domestic unemployment rate
The unemployment rate for domestic labor is dened by s
D
1
sD1 +s
D
2
: With the aid of (x)sD1 =
sD2 + gsD2 ; the domestic unemployment rate can be reexpressed as
URD =
sD1
sD1 + sD2
=
1
1 + (x
)
+g
: (56)
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Di¤erentiating (56) with respect to  gives
@URD
@
< 0 (57)
M " )  #) x #) (x) #) URD "
It shows that the long-run level of the unemployment rate for domestic citizens rises with more
illegal immigrants entering into the economy.
Finding a unique solution for sM1
Combining _sM1 = 0 together with _s
M
2 = 0 yields
_sM1 = 0
_sM2 = 0
9>=>;) +  + (x
)
 + g
sM1 =
1

(1 +
(x)
 + g
) (sM1 )
 
: (58)
Let h(sM1 ) =
++(x)
+g s
M
1 and g(s
M
1 ) =
1
 (1 +
(x)
+g )
 (sM1 )
 
: Draw both h(sM1 ) and
g(sM1 ) in the diagram below.
The curve for h(sM1 ) is strictly increasing, but the curve for g(sM1 ) is strictly decreasing with
respect to sM1 . In addition, g(0) > h(0): If a solution to (58) exists, then it is unique. Its easy to
observe that there exists a unique intersection point between the above two curves which jointly
determine a unique solution for sM1 .
Finding a unique solution for sM2
Using the expression of sM2 =
(x)sM1
+g ; we can nd a unique s
M
2 :
Finding the e¤ect of an increase in illegal immigration on the fraction of migrants in search
29
Di¤erentiating (58) with respect of  yields
+  + (x)
 + g
sM1 =
1

(1 +
(x)
 + g
) (sM1 )
 
) @s
M
1
@
=  
sM1 + 
 1(1 + (x
)
+g )
  1(sM1 )
 
+  + (x) +  1( + g)(1 + (x
)
+g )
 (sM1 )  1
@(x)
@
) @s
M
1
@
< 0: (59)
M " )  #) sM1 "
From (59), we observe a negative relationship between  and sM1 : Thus, when free entry is
allowed, more illegal immigrants search for jobs in the long run.
Finding the e¤ect of an increase in illegal immigration on the fraction of migrants in work
Equation (50) shows (x)sM1 = sM2 + gsM2 :
Di¤erentiating (50) with respect to  gives
sM1
@(x)
@
+ (x)
@sM1
@
= ( + g)
@sM2
@
) @s
M
2
@
=
sM1
 + g
@(x)
@
+
(x)
 + g
@sM1
@
) @s
M
2
@
= [
sM1
 + g
+
(x)
 + g
( 
sM1 + 
 1(1 + (x
)
+g )
  1(sM1 )
 
+  +  +  1( + g)(1 + (x
)
+g )
 (sM1 )  1
)]
@(x)
@
) @s
M
2
@
> 0:
M " )  #) sM2 #
The adverse consequence of the entry of illegal immigrants is that the fraction of illegal immi-
grants in work becomes lower.
Finding a unique solution for sD2
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Utilizing both _cc = 0 and _s
D
1 = 0; we can derive
[(

+ 
)

1    ( 
+ 
)
1
1  (g + )  dx  + g
(x)
]| {z }
A
sD2   (1  )(

+ 
)

1 sM2 (1  )
+(1  )sM2 [(

+ 
)

1    ( 
+ 
)
1
1  (g + )] +
dx(+ )
(x)
sM2 (1  )  dx(1  )sM1
= [(1  )( 
+ 
)

1   dx
(+ )
(x)(1  ) ](1 +
 + g
(x)
)  1(sD2 )
 : (60)
Let A = [( + )

1    ( + )
1
1  (g + )  dx +g(x) ]
A direct calculation shows ( + )

1  (1  g++ ) > ( + )

1  (1  ) as  > g: Using the expression
for c(sD1 + sD2 ) given by (52), we have
c(sD1 + s
D
2 )
 = (1  )( 
+ 
)

1    dx
(+ )
(x)(1  )
) (1  )( 
+ 
)

1  >
dx(+ )
(x)(1  ) > 0:
Therefore,
(

+ 
)

1  (1  g + 
+ 
) >
dx(+ )
(x)(1  ) >
dx( + g)
(x)
) A > 0:
as 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1:
Let LHS and RHS of (60) be h(sD2 ) and g(sD2 ), respectively.
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There is a unique intersection point between the curves for h(sD2 ) and g(sD2 ), which leads to
a unique solution for sD2 .
Finally, the unique sD2 implies the unique sD1 ; k; and c as sD1 =
(+g)
(x) s
D
2 ; k
 = ( + )
1
1  [sD2 +
(1  )sM2 ]; and c = 1(sD1 +sD2 ) [(1  )(

+ )

1    dx(+)(x)(1 ) ]:
The above procedures demonstrate that a steady state of this dynamic system can be uniquely
determined. 
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Figure 1: Long-run e¤ects of illegal immigration when { = 0:2:
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Figure 2: Long-run e¤ects of illegal immigration when { = 0:4:
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Figure 3: Long-run e¤ects of illegal immigration when { = 0:7:
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Figure 4: Long-run e¤ects of illegal immigration when { = 1
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Figure 5: Transition dynamics after a 5% increase in illegal immigration.
37
T
ab
le
2
:
St
ab
le
E
ig
en
va
lu
es
{
=
0:
2
{
=
0:
4
{
=
0:
7
{
=
1
m
R
oo
t
1
R
oo
t
2
R
oo
t
3
R
oo
t
1
R
oo
t
2
R
oo
t
3
R
oo
t
1
R
oo
t
2
R
oo
t
3
R
oo
t
1
R
oo
t
2
R
oo
t
3
0
 0
:9
75
5
 0
:8
00
2
 0
:0
44
9
 1
:0
4
7
6
 0
:7
3
4
4
 0
:0
5
0
0
 1
:1
2
4
0
 0
:6
6
6
0
 0
:0
5
7
4
 1
:1
77
0
 0
:6
16
2
 0
:0
64
7
0
:1
0
 0
:9
19
2
 0
:7
51
0
 0
:0
43
2
 0
:9
9
1
2
 0
:6
9
1
9
 0
:0
4
7
8
 1
:0
6
8
8
 0
:6
3
2
2
 0
:0
5
4
5
 1
:1
23
0
 0
:5
89
1
 0
:0
61
1
0
:2
0
 0
:8
59
7
 0
:6
98
8
 0
:0
41
7
 0
:9
3
1
4
 0
:6
4
6
3
 0
:0
4
5
7
 1
:0
0
9
6
 0
:5
9
5
7
 0
:0
5
1
5
 1
:0
65
2
 0
:5
60
1
 0
:0
57
2
0
:3
0
 0
:7
96
6
 0
:6
43
1
 0
:0
40
3
 0
:8
6
7
3
 0
:5
9
7
1
 0
:0
4
3
7
 0
:9
4
5
9
 0
:5
5
6
2
 0
:0
4
8
4
 1
:0
02
5
 0
:5
28
7
 0
:0
52
9
0
:4
0
 0
:7
29
0
 0
:5
83
2
 0
:0
39
2
 0
:7
9
8
1
 0
:5
4
3
7
 0
:0
4
1
8
 0
:8
7
6
5
 0
:5
1
2
8
 0
:0
4
5
2
 0
:9
33
9
 0
:4
94
3
 0
:0
48
2
0
:5
0
 0
:6
56
0
 0
:5
18
5
 0
:0
38
5
 0
:7
2
2
7
 0
:4
8
5
4
 0
:0
4
0
1
 0
:8
0
0
0
 0
:4
6
4
7
 0
:0
4
2
0
 0
:8
57
8
 0
:4
55
9
 0
:0
43
4
38
